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Fiscal equalizations programs are fairly common features of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in industrial countries. Some developing countries have also recently introduced 
these programs and still others are contemplating such programs. Institutional 
arrangements for fiscal equalization vary across countries with wide variations in the 
form and membership of the relevant decision making bodies. This paper provides a 
simple neo-institutional economics framework for assessing alternative institutional 
arrangements for their impacts on simplicity, transparency and objectivity of the 
equalization program as well as transaction costs for various parties involved.  
Comparing institutional arrangements across different countries is a daunting task. 
The success of these arrangements depends upon a multitude of factors. The success of 
governance structures for fiscal matters may depend not only on the incentives regime 
associated with their inner structures but also their interactions with other formal and 
informal institutions in the country. This paper presents a simple framework to 
understand these incentives and interactions and draw implications for their impacts on 
transactions costs for the society as a whole and achievement of societal objectives. An 
application of these concepts to the specific case of institutional arrangements for fiscal 
equalization transfers are carried out and the predictions based upon the theory are 
compared to observed experiences in major federal countries. The paper demonstrates 
that the simple new institutional framework presented here has a significant power for 
predicting potential impacts. The paper concludes, both in theory and practice, that the 
case for independent grants commission to enhance the transparency, equity and 
accountability of the intergovernmental finance system is vastly exaggerated. 
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Fiscal equalization programs are fairly common features of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in industrial countries. Some developing countries have also recently introduced 
these programs and still others are contemplating such programs. Institutional 
arrangements for fiscal equalization vary across countries with wide variations in the 
form and membership of the relevant decision making bodies. For ease of analysis, these 
diverse arrangements can be broadly classified into five stylized models: (1) a central 
government ministry/agency; (2) independent agency (grants commission) reporting 
either to the executive or the legislature on a permanent or periodic basis; (3) 
intergovernmental forums including intergovernmental cum civil society forums; (4) 
national legislature; and (5) sub-national government forums. These arrangements have 
not yet received the attention that is due in view of their importance in creating a credible 
and stable fiscal transfers regime and only a handful of recent papers (Searle, 2004, Boex 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004) have documented these arrangements and provided 
commentaries on alternate regimes. This paper carries this work further by providing a 
simple neo-institutional economics framework for assessing alternative institutional 
arrangements for their impacts on simplicity, transparency and objectivity of the 
equalization program as well as transaction costs for various parties involved.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the goals for 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. It further highlights variety of institutional 
arrangements pursued by various countries to further these goals. Section 3 presents a 
simple framework to conduct a comparative evaluation of institutional arrangements. 
Section 4 presents a qualitative evaluation of alternate institutional arrangements with 
special emphasis on the Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia. A concluding 
sections draws policy implications of this analysis. 
 
2. Goals and Alternate Models of Institutional Arrangements for Revenue Sharing 
and Equalization Transfers 
 
Institutional arrangements for fiscal transfers are typically structured to fulfill a number 
of objectives. These include both the process and program objectives. Program objectives 
seek to design a program that is consistent with general revenue sharing and/or 
equalization objectives. Further the design should be simple so that it is easily understood 
to forge a broader consensus, ownership and support. It should use uncontestable data 
and transfer funds in such a way to respect local autonomy while creating incentives 
environment that is compatible with accountability for results. These program objectives   3
require a process of consultation with recipient governments that is open and transparent, 
conducive to consensus building and entails a relatively low cost of transactions for all 
parties concerned. The process should further aim to ensure that there is a wider public 
acceptance of the programs that are implemented.  
 
While the above objectives are commonly shared, specific institutional arrangements 
structured to fulfill those objectives vary widely across countries. Nevertheless, to 
simplify matters for analysis, in the following we present five stylized groupings of these 
arrangements. 
 
(a) Central/National Government Agency Model: This is the most commonly practiced 
model in both industrial and developing countries. A central agency typically, either the 
president or prime minister’s office or the ministry of finance or home affairs or local 
government or planning (including planning commission) assume sole or shared 
responsibilities for policy making and implementation of a system of fiscal transfers 
including equalization transfers. A few country examples of such arrangements are 
reported below: 
 
Office of the President: Kyrgyz Republic, Tanzania (Regional Administration and Local 
Government Unit)  
 
Ministry of Finance: China, Italy (policy only), Kazakhstan. Netherlands (shared with the 
Ministry of Home Affairs), Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine 
 
Ministry of Home Affairs/Interior: Italy (distribution of funds only), Netherlands (with 
Ministry of Finance), Philippines (Ministry of Interior and Local Government), South 
Korea (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs) 
 
Ministry of Local Government: Ghana (Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development), Zambia 
 
Planning commission: India (for plan/capital grants) 
 
Ministry of Public Administration: Japan (Ministry of Finance is consulted). 
 
 
(b) National Legislature. In almost all countries with the single exception of China, 
national legislature must enact legislation to provide a legal basis for central-state-local 
transfers. Brazil, however, represent a unique case where 1988 Constitution specifies the 
pool and the broad criteria for revenue sharing transfers and the upper house of the 
national parliament (the Senate) serves as the primary decision making body for specifics 
of the formula as well as monitoring compliance. The Senate regulations spell out the 
specific distribution criteria for the state and municipal participation funds (see Shah, 
1991). 
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(c) Intergovernmental Forums 
 
Intergovernmental forums facilitate consultations among various orders of government 
and to strike a balance among competing interests and mediate conflicts. In view of this 
such institutional arrangements are commonplace in federal countries. In some countries 
such as Australia and the Republic of South Africa where an independent agency has 
been assigned a strong role in intergovernmental fiscal relations, intergovernmental 
forums are also established to review and decide on independent agency 
recommendations. Among the industrial countries Canada and Germany and among 
developing countries Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan rely solely on intergovernmental 
forums for decisions on fiscal transfers. The following paragraphs highlight salient 
features of these institutional arrangements. 
 
Canada: Fiscal Arrangements Committee 
 
The primary legal responsibility for the design of fiscal transfers rests with the federal 
government (Ministry of Finance) and final approval with the national parliament. The 
Federal Government of Canada, nevertheless, places a strong emphasis on 
intergovernmental consultation and shared decision making on intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. Federal-provincial fiscal arrangement committees play a pivotal role in 
providing substance to such dialogues (see Figure 1). The Federal-Provincial Relations 
Division in the Ministry of Finance provides a secretariat for these committees. Fiscal 
Arrangements Committee comprises federal and provincial finance and/or treasury 
officials concerned with fiscal transfers. They meet periodically but exchange 
information and comments on a continuing basis on all technical aspects of fiscal 
arrangements. The recommendations of this subcommittee is fed to the Continuing 
Committee of Officials on Fiscal and Economic Matters comprising federal and 
provincial deputy ministers of finance (or treasurers). This Committee is chaired by The 
Federal Deputy Minister of Finance and usually meets on a quarterly basis. The final 
recommendations of this Committee for further action are forwarded to regular (typically 
semi-annual) meetings of federal and provincial Ministers of Finance and/or Provincial 
Treasurers chaired by the Federal Minister of Finance. The fiscal equalization program is 
monitored and reviewed by these committees on a continuing basis with an intensive 
review every five years to suggest revisions for the enactment of new national legislation 
for the next five year period.  
 
Germany: Financial Planning Council 
 
The German federal system emphasizes sharing of responsibilities and joint decision 
making embodied in uniform federal legislation applicable to all landers (states). The 
upper house of the parliament, Bundesrat, with representation from lander governments, 
serves to strengthen a common approach. In fiscal relations, major decisions on the 
fraternal equalization transfers program are reached through a solidarity pact at a forum 
of federal and state leaders (presidents). Substantive inputs for reaching this pact come 
from the Financial Planning Council (Finanzplanungsrat) which establishes guidelines 
and recommendations for policy action on the financing of budgets in the short and   5
medium term. The Council aims to reach agreement on fiscal policy coordination among 
federal and state governments. This Council comprises Federal Ministers of Finance and 
of Economics, the State Ministers responsible for Finance, four representatives of the 
municipalities (appointed by the Bundesrat based upon nominations by the municipal 
associations). The Council is chaired by the Federal Minister of Finance (see Spahn, 
2001) and is required to meet at least twice a year. 
 
Indonesia: Regional Autonomy Advisory Board (DPOD) 
 
The Regional Autonomy Advisory Board (DPOD) serves as important intergovernmental 
forum in support of the Law No.22/1999 on Regional Governance and the Law No. 
25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions. The 
Board advises the President on all aspects of local government organization and finance 
issues. The Board is chaired by Minister of Home Affairs with the Minister of Finance 
serving as the Deputy Chair. Other members of this Board include, Secretary of State, 
Minister of Administrative Reform, Minister of Defense, Chairman of the National 
Development Planning Board (BAPENNAS), two representatives each of the Provinces, 
Kota (districts) and Kabupaten (towns) and one representative each of the associations of 
Provinces, Kota and Kabupaten (see Searle, 2004 for details and a critique). Technical 
work on fiscal matters including fiscal equalization grants is conducted by the Directorate 
General for Center-Region Fiscal Balance of the Ministry of Finance. Work on planning 
grants is carried out by the National Planning Board. The DPOD reviews the 
recommendations of the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Board and makes 
final decisions. Monitoring and implementation responsibilities lie with the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. 
 
Nigeria: Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
 
The 1999 Constitution mandated the creation of the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission to administer the federal-state-local fiscal transfers as well as 
provide advice on revenue mobilization at state and local levels. The Commission is 
chaired by the Federal Minister of Finance and comprises of Finance Commissioners or 
Accountant Generals from each state. The Commission meets each month to review 
financial flows (see Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004).  
 
Pakistan: National Finance Commission 
 
The establishment every five years of a limited duration National Finance Commission is 
mandated under article 160 of the 1973 Constitution. The Constitution empowers the 
Commission to make recommendation to the President on the pool of revenues to be 
distributed as well as the allocation criteria. In addition, the Commission advises on the 
exercise of the borrowing powers by all levels of government. The Commission is 
chaired by the Federal Minister of Finance and comprises Provincial Ministers of Finance 
and other civil society members (e.g. legislators, scholars, experts, distinguished citizens 
etc) appointed by the President after consultation with provincial governors. The Federal 
Ministry of Finance serves as a secretariat for the Commission. The Commission makes   6
its decision by consensus. If the Commission fails to reach a consensus on the formula for 
allocation of transfers as has been the case in recent years, then the formula that was 
operative in the previous five years is allowed to continue to operate until such time that a 
new consensus can be forged.  
 
 
(d) Independent Agency (Grants Commission) Model 
 
An independent agency is created usually by the central government to report either to 
the executive or legislature on a permanent or periodic basis. Australia pioneered this 
model by creating the Commonwealth Grants Commission in 1933 to assess claims made 
by states for financial assistance (special grants) under section 96 of the Constitution. 
This model has since then been adopted in several other countries most notably India, the 
Republic of South Africa and Uganda. In view of the growing popularity of this model of 
transfers governance, brief remarks on a sample of such commissions are presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) of Australia 
 
This commission was created in 1933 in response to dissatisfaction expressed by states 
especially a secession threat by Western Australia with the bilateral negotiations with the 
federal government on applications for special grants. The Commission in its 1936 report 
articulated that its assessment of the States’ funding needs were to be based upon their 
capacity to raise revenue and any abnormal expenditure influences they faced. It stated 
that “special grants are justified when a state through financial stress from any cause is 
unable efficiently to discharge its functions as a member of the federation and should be 
determined by the amount of help found necessary to make it possible for that state by 
reasonable effort to function at a standard not appreciably below that of other states.” 
(source Australian Treasury, 2004). The Commission’s mandate was vastly expanded in 
1973 (The CGC Act, 1973) when it assumed responsibility for calculating the per capita 
relativities for allocation of federal general revenue sharing assistance to all states and the 
Northern Territory and the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands; financing of works and 
services in the capital; determination of state entitlements for local government as well as 
determination of state grants to local governments. In 1975, state commissions relieved 
the CGC of its role in determining state grants to local governments. The determination 
of state entitlements for local governments was terminated by the Local Government 
Financial Assistance Act, 1986.The special grant program for selected states under 
section 9 of the Constitution was terminated in 1981/82 and replaced by program of 
assistance for all states and calculation of state relativities for general revenue grants that 
includes tax sharing, health and special grants on a five year basis with annual updates.  
The Commission consists of a chairperson and a maximum of five members appointed by 
the federal government in consultation with the states. The Commission has a permanent 
secretariat of about 60 (as of October 2004) staff members. The day-to day working of 
the Commission is handled by a Secretary and two assistant secretaries responsible for 
Expenditure Analysis Branch and Revenue, Budgets and Research Branch respectively.    7
The Commission is constituted as an advisory body and empowered to conduct it 
business only within the purview of the terms of references provided by the Federal 
Minister of Finance and Administration. It does not have the powers to initiate and 
pursue inquiries on its own authority. In recent years, the main references have sought 
Commission’s advice on per capita relativities for distributing, among the States and 
Territories, the pool of general revenue assistance made available by the Commonwealth. 
For this purpose, the Commission in 2004 applied a specific principle of fiscal 
equalization, which says that 
State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and services tax revenue and 
health care grants such that, if each made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources 
and operated at the same level of efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at 
the same standard. (Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004)  
Another important matter on which the Commission has reported in recent years is the 
interstate distribution of general purpose grants for local government. Although the 
references are provided by the Minister for Finance and Administration, their content is 
usually decided in negotiations between the Commonwealth and the States, conducted 
largely through their treasuries. A formal mechanism for this purpose is the Heads of the 
Australian Treasuries (HOTS) Forum which meets periodically. While the resulting 
Commission reports are provided formally to the Commonwealth Government, they are 
made available to the states immediately thereafter. The relativities recommended in 
those reports are considered at the Annual Treasurers’ Conference. The Commission’s 
relativities are almost always accepted by the Treasurers’ Conference as preliminary 
relativities are publicly defended by the Commission in open adversarial proceedings in 
all states prior to their formal presentation. Only in 1981 ( the Commission was asked to 
re-do the relativities and present a new report in 1982) and in 1982 the Commonwealth 
Government chose not to accept the Commission’s recommendation but instead the 
Premiers’ Council under the leadership of Prime Minister J.M. Fraser (Commonwealth 
Treasurer, J.M. Howard) adopted relativities different from those recommended by the 
Commission for the years 1982-1984 (see Commonwealth of Australia, 1995, pp.137-158 
).  
 
The Finance Commissions of India 
 
The Finance Commissions of India comprising a chair and four members are constituted 
by the President every five years to meet the constitutional requirement (under Article 
280 of the Constitution of India, 1949 as amended in 1992 and 1993) to redress the fiscal 
gaps in the revenues and expenditures of the Union (federal) and State governments 
arising out of a mismatch of revenue means and expenditure needs at various levels. The 
Finance Commission is mandated to make recommendations to the President as to: 
(a) the distribution between the Union and the States of net proceeds of taxes which 
are to be, or may be, divided between them and the allocation between the states 
of the respective shares of such proceeds; 
(b) the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States 
out of the Consolidated Fund of India; 
(c) the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement 
the resources of the Panchayats in the State on the basis of the recommendations 
made by the Finance Commission of the State;   8
(d) the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement 
the resources of the Municipalities in the State on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State; and  
(e) any other matter referred to the Commission by the President in the interests of 
sound finance. achieve this through revenue sharing and special grants to needy 
states. The Commission is also required to recommend allocation among states of 
their share of federal taxes. 
The first Finance Commission was established in 1951 by an act of parliament, the 
Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 (Act XXXIII of 1951). 
Subsequently, these commissions have been reconstituted every five years with new 
terms of reference for the next quinquenniel period. According to the 1951 Act, the 
chairperson of the Commission must have experience in public affairs members may be 
selected from among persons who: (a) are, or have been, or qualified to be appointed as 
judges of a High Court; or (b) have special knowledge of the Finances and Accounts of 
the Government; (c) have had wide experience in financial matters and in administration; 
or (d) have special knowledge of economics. The Commission members are usually a 
mix of politicians, retired civil servants and experts in fiscal federalism. Each 
Commission creates a temporary secretariat managed by a secretary appointed by the 
federal government usually from the Planning Commission. The Commission is 
disbanded upon submission of a report consistent with its terms of reference. The 
Commission does not have the mandate to initiate an inquiry outside its terms of 
references. The Commission’s recommendations are not binding upon the government 
but under article 281 of the Constitution, these must be presented to both houses of the 
parliament along with government response to each recommendation.  
 
Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC) of the Republic of South Africa 
 
The FFC was established in 1993 under section 198 of the 1993 interim Constitution. The 
commission was to have 18 members appointed by the President with nine members 
designated one each by nine provincial cabinets. The interim Constitution gave a broad 
mandate to the Commission in providing advice on financial and fiscal requirements of 
the national provincial and local governments (section 199(1)(a)). The Final Constitution 
of 1996 expanded the Commission membership to 22 by adding two representatives from 
the organized local government structure and two additional presidential appointments. 
Such a large membership was subsequently seen as unwieldy and an amendment to the 
Constitution carried out in 2001 (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Second Amendment Act, 2001, section 7) reduced the Commission membership to the 
current strength of nine to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Cabinet 
and Executive Councils of the nine provinces as follows: 
•  A chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson 
•  Three members recommended by provincial premiers; 
•  Two members recommended by local governments; and 
•  Two other members.  
 
The 1996 Constitution (section 214(1)) narrowed Commission’s mandate to provide 
advice on equitable allocation of central revenue sharing to provincial and local   9
governments; provincial taxation; municipal fiscal powers and function; sub-national 
borrowing and central government guarantees (sections 218(2), 228(2)(b), 229(5) and 
230(2)). The role of the Commission was further clarified by Central legislation. The 
Borrowing Powers of Provincial Governments Act, 1966 authorized the Minister of 
Financed to seek Commission’s advice on provincial borrowing and debt management 
issues. The Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act, 2001 empowers the Commission to 
provide comments on tax proposals by the provinces.  
 
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 clarified the institutional arrangements 
and the processes for the Commissions’ advice to executive and legislative organs. The 
Commission was given an observer status at the Budget Council, a forum of the Ministers 
of Finance of Center and the Provinces. Further the Act requires the Commission to 
provide advice on equitable shares at least 10 months prior to the commencement of the 
fiscal year and the Division of Revenue Bill must include comments by the national 
government on the Commission’s recommendation. Overall the Commission enjoys a 
strong constitutional-legal foundation to play role of an influential advisor on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. This role was carefully crafted to ensure that “it can 
bark, but not bite” (Wehner, 2003, p.5). 
 
Uganda: Local Government Finance Commission 
 
The Local Government Finance Commission of Uganda is mandated under the 1995 
Constitution (article 194(1,4)) and the Local Government Finance Act, 2003 (section 9) 
to serve as an advisory body to national government (Minister of Local Government) on 
all matters relating to transfer of resources to local government and to advise local 
governments on appropriate levels of local revenues. It is expected to recommend both 
the total pool of transfers as well as allocations to local governments in the form of 
equalization and conditional grants. In addition, it monitors compliance of local 
governments with legal requirements associated with their taxing and spending decisions. 
It is also empowered to mediate financial disputes among local governments. 
 
The Commission consists of seven commissioners appointed by the President as follows: 
•  Three commissioners nominated by the district councils through the Uganda 
Local Authorities Association; 
•  One commissioner nominated by the Urban Councils through Urban Authorities 
Association of Uganda; 
•  Three commissioners nominated by the Minister of Local Government in 
consultation with the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. 
 
The President designates two of the commissioners as Chairperson and Deputy 
Chairperson who work on a full time basis. The rest of the commissioners serve on a 
part-time basis only. A permanent secretariat headed by a secretary with 31 staff conducts 
the day-to-day business of the Commission. 
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3. A New Institutional Economics (NIE) Framework for Evaluating Alternative 
Institutional Arrangements for Equalization Transfers 
 
The previous section noted diverse institutional arrangements are used for decision 
making on central-state-local transfers. There is, however, no framework available in the 
literature to provide a comparative evaluation of these arrangements to guide future 
reform efforts. This section attempts to fill this void by borrowing ideas and concepts 
from a relatively new discipline of neo-institutional economics (see North, 1990). Under 
the NIE framework both the principals and their agents act rationally in their own self-
interest. The access to information is costly and not uniformly available to all. In such 
circumstances, the agent may not secure the interests of their principals and the principals 
may not be able to restrain opportunistic behaviors of their agents due to the “bounded 
rationality” of principals and high transactions costs associated in overcoming this 
handicap.  
 
In the context of institutional arrangements for a fiscal equalization program, the problem 
manifests itself as follows. First, there needs to be national compact on equalization 
principles and standards so that there is a clear view on the mandate given by principals 
(citizens). This compact can take the form a constitutional provision, legislative 
enactment or an informal but universally shared consensus on the goals of such a 
program. This compact, however, will have to be administered by various public agents 
e.g. executive and legislative organs typically at the national level. Such administration 
may entail commitment problems where it may be in the self interest of some agents not 
to follow the compact. For example, the national executive or legislative leadership may 
come from a region with little enthusiasm for interstate equity. Alternately current regime 
is committed but unable to tie the hands of future regimes and thereby durability of the 
compact is threatened. Enshrining of equalization principles in the constitution is often 
motivated by these considerations. But constitutional enshrinement limits the 
commitment problem but does not overcome it as current coalitions can be replaced by 
coalitions of opposing interests and policy preferences in the future
ii. 
 
Institutional arrangements for administering the compact also entail a number of 
transactions costs for principals and their agents. For principals various types of 
arrangements impose differential participation and monitoring costs (PMC). There are 
also costs associated with legislative (LC) and executive decision making (EDMC). 
These costs are the time and effort needed to strike a legislative compromise or an 
executive decision. They are higher when stakes for individual parties are high and when 
there are strong conflicts of interest and when there is some uncertainty as to the future 
revenue streams available to donor and recipient governments – a frequently recurring 
situation in negotiations on fiscal transfers. All institutional arrangements entail costs 
incurred by principals to induce compliance by their administrative agents with the 
compact, the so-called agency costs (AC). Agency costs arise as the administrative agents 
to implement the compact on behalf of the principals may not share the objectives 
pursued by the principals. They may undertake decisions to serve narrow self interest of 
bureaucratic power or personal enrichment and because of the high transactions costs, 
civil society or the legislature may not be able to exercise effective oversight on these   11
decisions. In view of the difficulty of monitoring and taking corrective action ex-post, 
legislatures typically try to influence the appointment of executives so that they share the 
same goal and would not undermine the enacted legislation. In addition, they rely much 
more on civil society monitoring and respond to “fire alarms” raised by unhappy 
constituents (Horn, 1997, p.21). But such response to fire alarms may be constrained if 
the executive agency is given a significant degree of autonomy
iii. Finally, there also risks 
and uncertainty costs (UC) associated with unstable regimes. Risks and uncertainty in 
fiscal relations, arises because both the potential benefits and costs of a given compact 
may not be fully known at the time a deal is struck. In the future, such a deal may be 
undone by a new coalition and constellation of interests. 
 
The analytical framework described above argues for instituting administrative 
arrangements and governance structures that (a) facilitate greater access to information 
by citizens, interested sectors of civil society (including the media and academics) and 
legislators that would enable them to better hold those agents involved in equalization 
decision-making to account; (b) minimize transaction costs associated with participation, 
monitoring and decision making, agency costs (costs incurred by principals and other 
agents to ensure that agents involved in equalization decision-making act faithfully to 
serve their mandates) and uncertainty costs; and (c) create an incentive structure for both 
the legislative and administrative agents to comply with their compact with the 
principals.  
 
This is a rather complex task because of interdependencies associated with various 
actions. For example, as pointed out by Horn (1997, p.24), attempt to reduce agency loss 
between citizens and legislatures through restraining the influence of legislatures on the 
executive may potentially increase agency losses between legislatures and government 
executives. There are further difficulties in ensuring durability of legislation which can be 





4. Comparative Evaluation of Alternate Institutional Arrangements using NIE 
Framework 
 
An earlier section highlighted four stylized types of institutional arrangements. A central 
government agency model represents one of the most prevalent arrangements. A national 
legislature model represents the least common of these arrangements. The first 
arrangement rests decision making solely in the hands of a central government agency 
and the second arrangement involves the legislature not just in legislation but also in 
executive decision making role. Other interesting options for institutional arrangements 
are represented by intergovernmental forums and independent agency models. In the 
following analytical comparisons of the two common options are made using the NIE 
framework. It must be noted at the outset that these two options are not necessarily 
exclusive choices and both arrangements can co-exist, but when they do, incremental 
value added offered by the independent agency must be rigorously examined.   12
 
Intergovernmental Forums: An intergovernmental forum provides a framework for 
institutionalized but restricted political bargaining
iv. Bargaining is restricted as the 
constitution and the legal framework usually define the limits to such bargaining. There 
is, however, strong peer pressure to strike a bargain. Thus intergovernmental forums are 
usually successful in defining an explicit political compact acceptable to all parties. As 
such a political compact cannot be easily reached when complex criteria are put on the 
table, this institutional model places great premium on simplicity and “rough justice” as 
opposed to complex but precise justice. Conflicting interests are represented at these 
forums. Unless the discussions of the forum are conducted in camera, political 
grandstanding may prevent political compromises. Durability of such compromises is 
usually assured as all parties stand to loose from a deal that is unraveled. Blame shifting 
is also not possible as the members of the forum assume full responsibility for their 
decisions. The forum further enables participating governments representing competing 
interests and varying commitments on equalization, to reach a broader consensus. 
 
Independent Agency (grants commission) model: An independent agency is usually 
established to seek an independent, professional, transparent and rigorous view of a 
complex task of developing recommendations on the determination of the pool, the 
allocation criteria and distribution of funds among recipient governments. The 
presumption here is that if such a decision is divorced from politics, the resulting criteria 
and the associated distribution would serve the broader interests of the nation as well as 
its constituent units better. These theoretical advantages are rarely achieved in practice. 
First, decisions on the standard of equalization e.g. the minimum level of per capita fiscal 
capacity to which all jurisdictions are entitled to be brought up to, cannot and should not 
be divorced from politics. Second, such an institutional arrangement creates a number of 
agency problems as discussed below. 
 
Mission creep: To secure its long term existence and enlarge its spheres of influence, an 
independent agency faces continuous imperatives reinterpreting its terms of reference to 
enlarge the scope of its activities. Such a mission creep goes unchecked as the politician 
do not want to be seen curtailing the search of such agencies for a holy grail – the 
ultimate formula for equitable distribution of federal funds.  
 
Incentives for complexity: An independent agency faces powerful incentives to seek ever 
more complex solutions to simple questions. This is because complexity and associated 
expertise fuels demand in the external market for professionals serving these agencies. 
The greater the complexity of formulae and associated calculations, greater is the 
premium placed by the market on professional possessing those skills. Interested parties 
submissions makes it politically imperative to accommodate ever growing complexity. 
Outside academic experts typically clamor for further complexity to achieve more precise 
justice. There is no escape from this circle as part time or term employment of members 
of the commission limits the oversight provided by them. It takes sometime for term 
members to grasp the complexity of the allocation rules and by the time they can form 
their own judgment on their relative merits, it is usually time for them to say good bye. In 
any case, the staff would be resistant to any simplification and those recipient   13
governments who benefit from the complexity and associated inequities of the system 
will likely block any reforms. Independent think tanks and researchers may even call for 
greater complexity to bring practice in conformity with the theory. In conclusion, 
constraining influences to keep the system simple and easily comprehensible are stunted 
by the very existence of an independent agency. 
 
Fire alarm oversight impractical and costly: Citizen oversight of such independent 
agencies becomes infeasible for several reasons. First, more complex the distribution 
criteria suggested by the agency, the more difficult it is for individual citizens and civil 
society groups to make informed comments. Further conflicting representation by various 
citizen groups trying to secure local interests strengthens broad discretion granted to such 
agencies in the interest of a scientific a-political approach. Even “fire alarm” oversight 
sought by legislatures becomes too costly and impractical as unhappy constituents make 
conflicting demands on their representatives.  
 
Tentative conclusions on a comparative evaluation of intergovernmental forum vs. 
independent agency model 
 
The above discussion suggests that the ultimate decision on relative merits of each 
institutional arrangement must be guided by an analysis of the incentive regime created 
by each institutional set-up and associated agency costs and their success in achieving 
simple, equitable and durable outcomes. Table 1 presents a comparative NIE perspective 
on these arrangements. The NIE framework predicts that overall transactions costs are 
expected to be higher and potential outcomes less desirable under an independent agency 
model as compared to an intergovernmental forum. These results stem from the fact that 
independence and autonomy offered to grant commissions weaken citizen oversight. 
Their drive for optimal (ideal) systems invites complexity and undermine transparency 
and accountability. Thus participation and monitoring costs as well agency costs rise. 
Intergovernmental forums on the other hand look for simple and feasible alternatives to 
strike a political bargain and thereby reduce transactions costs for the nation as whole. 
Higher transactions costs under independent grants commission nevertheless are not 
expected to secure better outcomes. On the other hand grants commission processes do 
not necessarily encourage consensus building that is achieved by forging a political 
compact on equalization standard. In the absence of a political compact on the 
equalization standard both the pool and allocation among constituent units, are 
determined quite independently of that equalization standard. Stability of allocation 
criteria is also not assured by a grants commission as the desire for perfection may lead to 
frequent changes in the methodology. In summary, the independent grant commission is a 
poor substitute for an intergovernmental forum. Its usefulness as a complementary 
institution to an intergovernmental forum is also quite limited in view of high agency 
costs and its pre-disposition towards optimal as opposed to feasible reforms.  
 
Why Then Are Independent Agencies (Grant Commissions) So Popular?  
 
The NIE framework suggests that independent grant commission may not represent a 
better institutional choice in view of the incentives regimes created by the underlying   14
structures. These conclusions run counter to predominant view in the fiscal federalism 
literature that such institutions personify “best practices” in institutional arrangements. In 
fact, it is quite commonplace for international development agencies and leading 
consultants to recommend establishment of such commissions in developing and 
transition economies (see Searle, 2004, Boex and Martinez-Vasquez, 2004). For a NIE 
analyst such popularity is not surprising if one looks at the incentive structure and culture 
of these institutions. Independent agencies find strong support among academic scholars, 
think tanks and politicians by playing to the enlightened self-interest of these groups. 
These agencies cater to “elites” especially academic elites as they give them a forum for 
dissemination of their research and scholarly works. The agencies are perceived to be a-
political pursuing technical excellence. Further they support the consulting industry by 
seeking their advice and analysis. These agencies serve as convenient tools for national 
and regional politicians as they are seen to be providing fair, balanced and professionally 
rigorous analysis. For any unpopular distribution criteria, politicians have the ability to 
distance themselves from the analysis and instead shift blame on the agency. Further, 
they can avoid taking hard decisions and simply accept the agency’s view as a “take it or 
leave it” proposition. No wonder one finds a growing chorus of professional and political 
views advocating independent agency approach to vital decisions on equalization 
transfers. 
 
5. From Theory to Practice: Do NIE Predictions Hold Water?  
 
The previous section presented in abstract a comparative analytical perspective on the 
working of intergovernmental forums and independent grants commissions. This section 
explores the same concepts based upon experiences of Canada and Germany with 
intergovernmental forums and of Australia and India with independent grant 
commissions. Note that we have abstracted from the complexity in Australia that the 
independent grant commission works as a complement to the intergovernmental forum 
(HOTS Forum). This abstraction should not bias our analysis as the recent history of the 
CGC in Australia demonstrates that it has enjoyed significant independence and 
autonomy and its recommendations have almost always been accepted by the Federal 
Cabinet. 
 
Table 2 reflects upon comparative experiences using NIE framework. Briefly the 
following lessons can be drawn from these experiences: 
 
Transactions Costs: The institutional arrangements in the four case study countries incur 
differential citizen participation and monitoring costs, agency costs and uncertainty costs. 
Intergovernmental forums typically lead to lower transactions costs for the principals 
(citizens) primarily due to greater transparency, simplicity and media and civil society 
scrutiny of programs. Agency costs are highest under the Australian program due to 
greater autonomy and incentives for complexity and mission creep faced by the CGC 
staff. The periodic grants commission in India has medium agency costs as it is 
constrained by its limited duration tenure. Legislative and executive decision making 
costs are very similar across case study countries. Overall intergovernmental forums   15
appear to offer less costly alternatives for the principals to induce compliance from their 
agents. 
 
Outcomes: Program outcomes are to be judged for clarity of mandate by the principals, 
durability of political consensus and for simplicity and equity of the equalization transfers 
programs. Equalization programs in Canada and Germany are enshrined in their 
constitutions. The Australian program is mandated by federal law and the Indian program 
is primarily concerned with equitable distribution of federal revenue sharing pool and has 
no explicit equalization objective.  
 
There is a reasonable degree of political consensus on the principles of equalization in 
Canada, Germany and Australia. No such consensus has yet emerged in India. What 
distinguishes Canadian and German programs from those of Australia and India are 
clarity of the equalization standard and simplicity in implementing it. Needless to say 
both these programs have a number of shortcomings (see Shah, 2003). The Australian 
and Indian programs lack clarity in equalization standard. 
 
Australia uses a comprehensive program attempting to equalize fiscal capacity as well as 
fiscal needs requiring highly complex calculations. Massive amounts of data are analyzed 
to calculate revenue disability for 18 tax bases and expenditure disabilities for 40 
programs with countless relevant determinants. The procedures used are so complex that 
the Australian program is a black box even for a serious student. The program thrust is on 
absolute comparability of services across states and territories. This focus diverts states’ 
energies to proving that “they need more to do less” as opposed to “doing more with 
less”. While the overall approach to expenditure needs is sound and defensible, the 
pursuit of idealism by the CGC and constant refinements lead to super complexity and 
non-transparency. For highly correlated factors disabilities are artificially magnified 
through double counting and multiplication. Under such a program use of judgment on 
factors and weights is inevitable but such judgments invite controversy and compromise 
the credibility of the whole program. When all is said and done the results are often 
disappointing. As the program lacks an explicit equalization standard, its generosity is 
overwhelming for its Northern Territory , Tasmania and South Australia and the program 
is punitive for Victoria and New South Wales. The program, however is not equitable and 
grant allocations vary directly with most macro fiscal capacity indicators (see Shah, 2004, 
for a detailed critique of the Australian Program and suggestions for simplification).  
The Indian formula is less complex but uses arbitrary factors and weights. Curiously 
enough all recent commissions have insisted on using 1971 state population figures for 
calculation of grant shares. The rationale presented is that India adopted a population 
control policy in that year. This is not defensible as the state population has experienced 
major changes due to migration. 
  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Comparing institutional arrangements across different countries is a daunting task. The 
success of these arrangements depends upon a multitude of factors. The success of   16
governance structures for fiscal matters may depend not only on the incentives regime 
associated with their inner structures but also their interactions with other formal and 
informal institutions in the country. This paper presented a simple framework to 
understand these incentives and interactions and draw implications for their impacts on 
transactions costs for the society as a whole and achievement of societal objectives. An 
application of these concepts to the specific case of institutional arrangements for fiscal 
equalization transfers was carried out and the predictions based upon the theory were 
compared to observed experiences in major federal countries. The paper demonstrates 
that the simple new institutional framework presented here has significant power for 
predicting potential impacts. The paper concludes, both in theory and practice, that the 
case for an independent grants commission to enhance the transparency, equity and 
accountability of the intergovernmental finance system is vastly exaggerated. 
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Figure 1 (b) 
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Table 1. Comparative Conceptual Evaluation of 
Intergovernmental Forum vs. Independent Agency (Grant 
Commission) 
  
 IGF  IA 
Transactions costs (overall): 
•  Participation and monitoring costs 
•  Legislative and executive decision making 
costs 
•  Agency costs 
•  Uncertainty costs 
 
 













•  Political compact on equalization standard 
•  Durability of political compact 
•  Pool determined by equalization standard 
•  Allocation determined by equalization 
standard 
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Table 2. Equalization Programs - 
Comparative Experiences with 
Intergovernmental Forum (IGF) vs. 
Independent Agency ( Grant Commission) 
(IA) 
      
 IGF  IGF  IA  IA 
  Canada       Germany Australia  India 
Transactions costs (overall): 
•  Citizen participation and 
monitoring costs 
•  Legislative costs 
•  Executive decision making 
costs 
•  Agency costs 




































•  Political consensus on 
equalization 
•  Durability of consensus 
•  Political compact on 
equalization standard 
•  Type of equalization program 
•  Pool determined by 
equalization standard 
•  Allocation determined by 
equalization standard 
•  Fiscal capacity equalization 
 
•  Fiscal need equalization 
•  Stability of allocation criteria 
•  Sunset clause 




•  Program Equity 
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NOTES                
                                                 
i This paper draws heavily on Boadway and Shah (forthcoming). Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented at the meetings of the Government of Canada Experts’ Panel on Fiscal Equalization, Montreal, 
Canada, September 1, 2005 and at the Conference on Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers at the Georgia 
State University, Atlanta, Georgia from October 3-5, 2004. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the author alone and should not be attributed to the World Bank. The author is grateful to Robin Boadway, 
Roy Bahl, Richard Bird, Jamie Boex, Fred Gorbet, Jorge Martinez, David Peloquin, and Bob Searle for 
comments. 
ii It should be noted that the cast of “agents of the citizenry” is potentially much broader than just the 
“executive and legislative organs” of the central government. These agents through intergovernmental 
competition – especially among states/provinces – and of players from civil society, can help ensure 
transparent self-regulation of any equalization governance regime through a system of checks and balances 
that minimizes the risk of “capture” and the resulting domination of a narrow set of more-or-less private 
interests in the governance regime. 
iii In his comments on this paper, David Peloquin has argued that it is not immediately clear who the 
“unhappy constituents” may be in the equalization context: presumably, it is provincial/state governments 
who are most likely to first raise “fire alarms” and then go about drumming up secondary alarms on the part 
of local civil society actors and the local citizenry (as recent Canadian experience demonstrates only too 
well…). Since provinces/states are the very same prime stakeholders who would be the main clients and 
interveners of any autonomous grants agency, it is not clear that the latter could in any sense be indifferent 
to them, given the quite credible threat of “going public” and appreciably raising the political and electoral 
stakes when they suspect their interests are not being given fair consideration.  
iv Note these restrictions should not be such as to reduce political bargaining to a zero sum game as under 
such a scenario, benefits of a federal bargain will be significantly curtailed.  